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CHAPTER 2 
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS AND REFORMS 
JOHN BEGHIN 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter first presents and summarises results from recent analytical lit-
erature, explaining the implications of different policy menus to abate pollu-
tion in a small, polluted, competitive economy opening to world trade. This 
situation is consistent with the stylised facts of many developing economies 
evolving in a global marketplace and with emerging environmental concerns. 
The context of a developing economy constrains the choice of available pol-
icy instruments for environmental objectives because of scarce institutional 
capacity. This limitation brings the possible temptation to use blunt policy 
instruments, such as trade barriers, for environmental purposes. The third 
section evaluates the case for harmonisation of environmental policies, which 
has been promoted by anti-globalisation and labour interests in the current 
policy debate and through recent demonstrations. Following these analytical 
sections, the chapter briefly describes the policy reform scenarios considered 
in the empirical investigation (Part B of the book). Then the chapter looks at 
the feasibility of environmental policy implementation for developing econo-
mies based on the recent experience of industrialised and developing econo-
mies. In this context, institutional feasibility of policies dominates.  
This chapter examines these various issues and explains that, in most 
cases, trade barriers are inadequate instruments for environmental purposes; 
they are inadequate because they are untargeted: they subsidise pollution in 
either production or consumption, while abating it in consumption or produc-
tion. Other simple instruments, such as taxes on input, production, or con-
sumption are much more targeted in the sense that they are likely to achieve 
substantial abatement of pollution while inducing smaller welfare losses, be-
cause they have a less-distorting impact on the rest of the economy.  
Uniform effluent taxes correspond to an implicit tax on output, which is 
proportional to the outputs’ pollution content. If they are available, effluent 
taxes or ambient standards are best suited to decrease intensities, because they 
decrease pollution with the smallest loss of economic welfare while providing 
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the best incentives to abate in industries where it is relatively easy to abate. 
However, they are difficult to implement because of monitoring cost and in-
formational requirements, but there is emerging evidence that this difficulty 
has been overestimated in the past (Wang and Wheeler 2000). As a further 
encouraging note, the econometric results presented in Chapter 4 suggest that 
input taxes on the few inputs responsible for most of the emissions could 
achieve substantial abatement while minimising monitoring costs and the bur-
den imposed on scarce institutional capacity. These input taxes could a p-
proximate effluent taxes quite well by providing incentives to substitute away 
from these dirty inputs.  
Trade liberalisation expands economic opportunities but may be detrimental to 
the environment, stimulating pollution-intensive activities. There is no self-
correcting mechanism under free trade that addresses these negative effects on the 
environment. Other policy interventions have to be introduced, such as the ones 
proposed in the previous paragraph, in coordination with free trade. Free trade 
enhances the effectiveness of environmental policies, because no trade barrier is 
present to influence and distort abatement decisions by firms and consumers. Fur-
ther, under free trade, abatement of pollution in production can be achieved by 
importing without incurring welfare losses induced by trade impediments. 
The numerical simulation results presented in the case studies in Part B of 
the book show that these broad policy-targeting principles established in a 
static context hold in the dynamic context of our case studies. Taxation with 
dynamics is more complicated because savings to be invested in the future are 
not currently taxed, whereas current production and consumption are taxed 
(Beghin, Roland-Holst, and van der Mensbrugghe 1999).  
2. NON-TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF RESULTS FOR A                                
SMALL, OPEN, DISTORTED ECONOMY
1 
Consider the situation of a competitive and open economy. Pollution is pro-
duced by consumers and producers at different rates and all pollution pro-
duced accumulates into a public “bad” which decreases welfare of consumers. 
Producers face output prices, which are the sum of the world price, import 
tariff, and production tax. Pollution taxes also influence producers’ decisions. 
These pollution taxes function like the price of the environmental input. Pro-
ducers are profit maximisers. Production-induced pollution is an input, which 
responds to taxes and output prices like any other input. By raising pollution 
taxes, goods will be less pollution intensive, and the output of pollution-
intensive commodities will decrease because cost of production will be higher 
with higher taxes. 
 
Consumers in this competitive economy maximise their well-being by al-
locating their income to consumption activities according to their prefer-
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price, border tariffs, consumption taxes, and pollution taxes applied to the 
pollution associated with the consumption of commodities. Consumers can 
only abate by changing their basket of consumption or by consuming less of 
everything. Raising the pollution tax discourages the consumption of com-
modities that are pollution intensive in consumption. Hence, consumption-
induced pollution is also “price-responsive.” Total pollution is a “bad” af-
fecting negatively the welfare of consumers. Consumers perceive total pol-
lution as a given. They perceive their atomistic decisions as having a negli-
gible impact on aggregate pollution. By aggregation of individual decision, 
however, total pollution reflects these choices. Total pollution is the sum of 
consumption and production externalities. 
It follows that imports (consumption – production) respond to pollution 
taxes and that pollution responds to changes in trade policy because incen-
tives to produce and consume goods that pollute are changed when trade 
policy reform occurs. It is useful to think of imports and pollution in terms 
of s ubstitutes and/or complements. When pollution increases with higher 
tariffs or when imports increase with higher pollution taxes, then they are 
substitutes (like the old margarine/butter example).
  Substitution occurs 
when production processes are pollution intensive relative to consumption 
of the same commodity; complementarity arises with production being rela-
tively cleaner than consumption of a good. It is difficult to categorise some 
goods a priori, such as fuel-based energy sources, because substantial efflu-
ents are emitted in both supply and demand. These cross-price responses 
must be assessed empirically. T he approach assumes the economy is at 
equilibrium, with the balance of payments being satisfied; that is, the val-
ues, at world prices, of aggregate imports and exports are equal.  
Next, the approach derives the effect of policy reforms, by changing tar-
iffs, production and consumption taxes, and effluent taxes on pollution. 
Then the effect of these reforms on consumer welfare is assessed analyti-
cally to see if policy menus are welfare enhancing. There are two sources of 
distortions and welfare effects. Non-zero tariffs (departing from free trade) 
and non-optimal effluent taxes (where the tax per unit of pollution is less 
than the marginal damage of pollution imposed on consumers) are distor-
tions which in turn have an impact on imports and pollution. 
When considering tax reforms, abatement of pollution has four compo-
nents. First, effluent taxes induce pollution abatement in consumption and 
production; second, there is the cross-price response of pollution to tariff 
changes; third, a feedback effect of pollution on itself arises because of 
changes in marginal damage of pollution; and last, a real income effect in-
duced by changes in welfare occurs. Further, the abatement induced by the 
effluent tax can be decomposed into several sources (substitution in con-
sumption and in production, and changes in emission intensities in produc-
tion). Tariffs cannot target pollution because they have opposite effects on 20  BEGHIN 
 
 
consumption-induced and production-based pollution. One is subsidised 
while the other is taxed. These offsetting effects can be decoupled by using 
production and consumption taxes i nstead of tariffs.  Similarly, import 
changes can be d ecomposed for changes in pollution taxes, tariffs, and 
feedback effects of pollution and real income.  
2.1. Policy Reform to Address Pollution 
This section first looks at pollution reforms, taking one policy instrument at a 
time. I first vary effluent taxes only, assessing its effects on domestic pollution 
and trade. Then production and consumption taxes are evaluated as next-best 
abatement instruments. Finally, tariffs alone are evaluated in the same context.  
2.1.1. Effluent Taxes 
This optimum policy equates the effluent tax to the (general equilibrium) mar-
ginal damage of pollution, taking into account the feedback effect of the tax on 
welfare via trade.
2 With this in mind, I consider an effluent tax proportional to 
the deviations between the general equilibrium marginal damage and the exist-
ing tax. Such a reform has two effects on welfare. The first effect is a positive 
effect on the environment by decreasing pollution. With respect to pollution, this 
is the best policy type because the effluent tax has three direct component-
effects: on production and consumption, holding per-unit effluent rate per unit of 
product constant; and on effluent rates via prices and effluent taxes, output and 
consumption being held constant. 
The second effect is the indirect impact of the same pollution reform on im-
ports. In general, it is not possible to sign this indirect effect because some im-
ports and pollution are substitutes while other imports are complements. Two 
cases are of special interest. If imports and pollution are substitutes and if tariffs 
are positive, then the effluent tax reform is welfare improving. This arises be-
cause the effluent tax decreases pollution-intensive production, which is subsi-
dised by tariffs. The tax decreases the deadweight loss of this implicit produc-
tion subsidy
3. 
If imports and pollution are instead complements and if tariffs are negative 
(export taxes), then the effluent tax reform is welfare improving. The intuition is 
that the pollution tax penalises the consumption of goods that pollute more in 
consumption than in production. The consumption of these goods is subsidised 
by the export tax, and the pollution tax decreases the deadweight loss of these 
subsidies. 
To illustrate these polar cases, consider an effluent tax on pollution related to 
gasoline. Gasoline pollutes when produced and consumed. First, consider a de-
veloping country with a protected domestic oil-refining industry but that (as a 
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clear that the pollution tax will decrease output (trade and pollution are substi-
tutes) and the deadweight loss associated with too much oil refining. Next, con-
sider the other limiting case in which the country imports all its gasoline, subsi-
dised by a negative tariff. In this case, imports and pollution are complements 
and an effluent tax will improve welfare by decreasing the deadweight loss of 
the implicit consumption subsidy. Many countries fall in between these two lim-
its and are involved in both production and consumption of gasoline. In such 
cases, the effect of the effluent tax on trade is an empirical question.  
2.1.2. Production and Consumption Taxes 
Production and consumption taxes are used because effluent taxes are not available 
and no distortions exist other than tariffs. Clearly, when both consumption and 
production pollute and at different rates, using two separate policy instruments 
allows one to decouple consumption and production pollution. Tariffs are incapa-
ble of doing so, and this reveals a major advantage of production and consumption 
taxes. The optimum consumption tax vector mimics the effluent tax, since it is re-
lated to the marginal damage of pollution but directly offsets the presence of tar-
iffs. The combined trade and consumption taxes are equal to the marginal damage 
of pollution because the consumption pollution intensities are fixed. By contrast, 
the production taxes are less effective for abatement, since they provide less incen-
tives to directly abate by decreasing pollution intensities of output. 
Taxes that are proportional to the pollution induced by the consumption and 
output of commodities mimic the effluent tax reform  discussed in the previous 
section. The direct effect of this consumption and production tax reform is to de-
crease pollution, but to a lesser extent than with the effluent tax as explained 
above. The indirect effect of these taxes on imports is ambiguous, as for the efflu-
ent tax, depending on the substitution/complementarity relationship between im-
ports and pollution. However, these taxes have a stronger effect on imports be-
cause they influence the producer and consumer prices of commodities more di-
rectly than did the effluent tax. 
2.1.3. Tariffs 
Tariff changes are considered to reduce pollution. When used alone, optimum 
tariffs are different from zero, reflecting the pollution externality, and they 
represent a compromise between pollution abatement in production and con-
sumption and efficiency losses induced by trade effects of the tariffs. In addi-
tion, if the price responses of pollution to tariff changes have both positive 
and negative elements, tariffs may not reduce pollution to a targeted level. 
This ambiguity has to be assessed empirically. The investigation of Indonesia 
reported in Chapter 10 suggests that significant pollution abatement with tar-
iffs is impossible and induces large trade effects in that country.  22  BEGHIN 
 
 
Trade liberalisation reform achieved by proportional tariff cuts have a posi-
tive effect on welfare via imports and an ambiguous effect on pollution. This 
latter indirect effect is symmetric to the indirect effect of the effluent tax on 
trade. Two special cases, symmetric to those of the effluent tax reform, exist. 
For example, if tariffs are positive and imports and pollution are substitutes, then 
a proportional decrease in tariffs is welfare improving. But, in general, the net 
welfare effects of trade liberalisation alone cannot be assessed analytically. 
2.2. Coordinated Trade and Pollution Reforms 
This section considers joint reforms: trade liberalisation and pollution targeting, 
first with effluent taxes, then with product taxes. 
2.2.1. Tariffs and Effluent Taxes  
If the two policy instruments are freely implementable, then their optimum lev-
els dictate the standard result: free trade and an effluent tax equal to the general 
equilibrium marginal damage of pollution. Proportional tariff reductions and efflu-
ent tax changes, proportional to and towards the marginal damage of pollution, 
improve welfare. Two direct effects arise. The tariff reform increases consumption 
possibilities by increasing trade; the pollution reform decreases pollution towards 
its optimum level. Two symmetric and indirect effects also occur: tariff changes 
influence pollution and effluent taxes have an impact on imports. Although the sign 
of these indirect effects is unknown, by convexity of the economy, these effects 
cannot be bigger in absolute value than the direct positive effects.
4 Joint reform of 
environmental and trade policy appears even more crucial when capital is mobile 
across borders and can exacerbate a country’s specialisation in dirty activities 
(Copeland 1994). 
2.2.2. Tariffs, Production, and Consumption Taxes  
The next reform considers proportional changes of all policies such that 
tariffs decrease proportionally, and consumption and production taxes are set 
to mimic the effluent tax, that is, set proportional to the pollution intensities of 
commodities in both production and consumption. As in the previous case, the 
tariff reform includes a positive utility effect and an ambiguous indirect pollu-
tion impact. Similarly, the production and consumption taxes bring positive 
environmental impacts but ambiguous indirect effects on imports.  
Unfortunately, the two indirect effects are cumulative but not symmetric as 
in the previous case, and mathematical properties described in note 4 are not 
sufficient to guarantee a net positive welfare effect. However, if one abstracts 
from the effects of the policies on effluent intensities in production, the wel-
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positive. Further, if the reform induces lower effluent rates, then the joint re-
form enhances welfare. This constitutes an ex post test, however. 
2.3. Extensions of the Results 
A first extension considers mixing quantitative interventions with tax instru-
ments. Usually the mix of instruments induces a feedback effect of the reform 
on the open-ended distortion (trade if tariffs are used, or effluents if some 
environmental taxes are used). Further structure has to be imposed on the 
problem to be able to derive sufficient conditions for welfare-improving re-
forms. For mixed regimes in which both effluent taxes and quotas are used, it 
is extremely difficult to identify useful results. However, trade liberalisation 
under a regime in which all effluents are capped by quotas leads to welfare 
improvements because pollution cannot increase. 
5 
A second extension relates to tax revenue considerations. Governments in 
developing economies have scarce public funds. Tax reforms may be more pal-
atable if they are revenue neutral or revenue increasing. The results discussed 
previously on sufficient conditions for welfare-enhancing reforms hold for tax-
revenue-neutral reform that combines tariff reductions and increases in environ-
mental taxes such that tax revenues do not decrease—giving rise to a double 
dividend (Beghin and Dessus 2001; Killinger 2000, and Smulders and Sen 
2001)—if the pre-reform tax structure is not optimum.  
A last extension of these results concerns variable pollution intensities in 
consumption. A problem arises in this case because the production of export-
ables responds directly to pollution taxes set in the export market while it re-
sponds indirectly to the domestic tax on consumption pollution. When pollu-
tion intensities emitted in consumption respond to taxes, an additional policy 
instrument is required to cap pollution intensities of exportables, for example, 
an effluent standard, to ensure welfare enhancement (Metcalfe and Beghin 
2000). The standard is set at the existing pre-reform level and hence is easier 
to set and design than for effluent taxes, which require some knowledge of 
marginal damage of pollution. Harmonised policies between trading countries 
that equate effluent taxes domestically and abroad yield the same result, al-
though it may not be optimal for countries to harmonise initially, especially if 
they have different valuation of the environment. Harmonisation is only a 
valid option between countries of comparable development levels and when 
their valuation of the environment is similar, as it would be within Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or European Union 
(EU) countries. Harmonisation between a developing country and an 
industrialised country makes little sense, since it will not be optimal for at 
least one (probably both) of the countries. I discuss harmonisation further in 
the next section. 24  BEGHIN 
 
 
3. SHOULD ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES BE HARMONISED? 
Environmental and labour interest groups often petition for so-called fair trade, 
implying that environmental and labour standards and policies be harmonised 
globally. Although some coordination of policies between two or more countries 
makes sense in some situations, the call for global harmonisation is without 
merit. Regional, rather than global, approaches to environmental standards may 
also prove to be a positive and more feasible step, particularly on issues with a 
clear regional component, such as transboundary emissions, and shared water 
resources, and for countries with similar development levels or with strong 
prospects of rapid income convergence.  
A regional approach does not imply uniform standards, in the broad sense of 
environmental protection (Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1996; Bhagwati and Hudec 
1996) and in the narrow sense of standards referring to pollution per unit of 
output in value or in physical units. The case against harmonisation of policies 
is overwhelming in most settings (Ulph 1999; Bhagwati 1996). The major rea-
son for such strong presumption resides in different levels of marginal damage 
of pollution across countries or, in other words, in different levels of the valua-
tion of the marginal benefits of environmental protection. 
When departing from the competitive market paradigm, the case against 
harmonisation remains strong, although coordination of policies between two 
countries may make sense. Coordination between countries is a better choice 
than using the subsidiary principle, where each country decides its policy level 
autonomously;  “eco-dumping” could arise if governments are constrained in 
their choice of policy instruments and face incentives to lower environmental 
policies below their optimum levels (Ulph 1999). 
In addition, some product standards constitute non-excludable attributes by 
providing a definition of goods and their quality. They reduce information 
asymmetries, just as labels do, and reduce transaction costs. They are endoge-
nous and change with i ncome and trade policy if the latter affects income 
(Casella 1996). Harmonisation or a move toward harmonisation may arise only 
if income levels between trading partners converge. These standards may be-
come common to several countries if coalitions supporting these standards cross 
borders. Hence, one could conceive of “harmonised” standards generated by 
political economy within a coalition of firms spanning several countries within 
one industry. 
4. POLICY SCENARIOS CONSIDERED IN THE CASE STUDIES 
The analytical results described above lay the groundwork for the design of 
policy experiments in our empirical investigation of the seven countries. In 
order to compare patterns across the seven countries, a common set of pol-
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are considered alone, and their effects on growth, trade, and pollution emis-
sions are evaluated. The taxes are imposed on one effluent type at a time 
and are increased over time to reach a targeted abatement level by the year 
2010, the chosen future horizon for the simulations in all the country case 
studies. Next, unilateral trade liberalisation is considered. Trade barriers are 
progressively removed so that free trade prevails between the country and 
the rest of the world or between the country and a subset of countries by the 
year 2010. Moderate improvements in the terms of trade (the price of ex-
ports relative to the price of imports) are imposed to simulate market inte-
gration with the rest of the world. The last set of simulations combines the 
environmental and trade reforms and shows how they interact. For some 
countries, additional scenarios are considered because of specific policy 
circumstances, such as North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
integration for Chile or the free trade agreement (FTA) with the European 
Community for Morocco. Also, different aggregations of pollutants are con-
sidered (e.g., in Indonesia). The three sets of reforms allow a gauge of the 
indirect effect of trade policy on pollution, of effluent taxes on trade, and of 
the gains realised with their coordination. All policy simulation results are 
presented in deviations from the results of a business-as-usual (BAU) sce-
nario, which is used for calibration purposes. The BAU scenario relies on 
gross domestic product (GDP) forecasts from McGraw Hill-Data Resource, 
Incorporated for the year 2010 and calibrates productivity parameters in 
each country’s model to make it consistent with the forecast. This provides 
a reference trajectory for each country, presenting estimates of GDP, trade, 
and pollution, if “nothing changes” in policy design.
6 
5. FEASIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN DEVELOPING 
ECONOMIES 
Given that trade liberalisation and environmental protection should be undertaken 
jointly, which environmental policies are feasible in a developing economy? Envi-
ronmental protection as part of the economic development process can be charac-
terised by a continuum of institutional quality guiding and sustaining decen-
tralised economic activity. There is both a supply side and a demand side to 
the quality of institutions protecting the environment, and both are influenced 
by the trade orientation of an economy. 
Economic growth implies higher consumer income and increasing con-
sumer demand for environmental protection. This is a “political” good since 
decentralised agents cannot readily purchase environmental protection on the 
market. This demand for environmental protection is multifaceted, like the 
environment. Economic agents first care about their immediate environment 
(water, air) or environmental factors directly affecting their health. At much 
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time eventually become prominent, but typically this is only after graduation 
from the developing economy stage. The “global village” is an industrialised 
country notion. Free trade reinforces the demand for effective environmental 
institutions by fostering the income prospects of economic agents through a 
greater pie and unfettered knowledge flows. 
On the supply side, governments in developing economies have scarce re-
sources and human capital to allocate to the provision of competing institu-
tional functions, including environmental protection. These governments are 
accumulating policy and institutional experience, and some stylised facts are 
emerging. Institutional knowledge can be transferred across industries and 
borders. Hence, the free movement of institutional knowledge reinforces the 
sustainability of economic development. Environmental side-agreements to 
trade agreements could facilitate such knowledge transfer. 
Cleaner technology innovation and adoption in industrial countries have 
been driven by environmental regulation. In all markets, transnational firms 
tend to standardise and replicate the technologies appropriate in the regulated 
North market. Combined with foreign direct investment and the use of tech-
nology-laden imported inputs, this cleaner technology is being transferred to 
developing economies. Hence, in the short run, environmental protection 
“spills over” from the North to the South and mitigates environmental degra-
dation in the South, but falls short of providing full-fledged environmental 
protection in the South. 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that all firms adopt the new and cleaner tech-
nology. Indeed there is a wide range of capital vintage in many industries 
(e.g., Pargal and Wheeler 1996). Capital stock is dated in mature industries 
and is more likely to pollute. Lessons can be learned from the industrial coun-
try experience when thinking about feasible environmental policy in the con-
text of developing economies (O’Connor 1994). As shown in our case studies 
in Part B of the book, it is clear that environmental protection is relatively 
inexpensive in terms of foregone growth. The same argument is valid while 
considering the capital cost of abatement for private firms. This is more obvi-
ous in fast-growing industries. Most industrialised countries have used “com-
mand and control” to address pollution in the last 30 years or so. Despite the 
well-known inefficiency of such an approach, the cost of compliance to indus-
tries has been small, and abatement has been substantial (Jaffe et al. 1995). 
Hence, the economic d ebate on efficiency of environmental policy 
instruments may be missing the point. Several approaches can be used by de-
veloping economies as long as they lead to a predictable outcome for private 
agents affected by the new policy.  
What has been the developing countries’ experience with various policies 
and institutions? Market-based instruments have proven effective in tackling 
environmental problems. A reduction of subsidies on pollution-intensive ac-
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taxes) decreases pollution and increases tax revenues. There are instances of 
such policy changes in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Brazil, and other countries 
(The World Bank 1997). Market-based instruments also provide incentives to 
save on the taxed resource and to become more resource-efficient. The more 
targeted the instrument, the better. Some countries, such as China and Malay-
sia, use emissions charges with some success (Wang and Wheeler 2000). 
When the cost of monitoring is not prohibitive, the market instrument can be 
very targeted. For example, stumpage fees are successfully used in many 
countries to foster sustainable forest management (The World Bank 1997).  
As institutional capacity progresses, more ambitious policies are feasible with 
political will. Chile and Malaysia offer examples of ambitious pollution control 
programs, which have been successful at abating air and water pollution. The de-
velopment of environmental protection is a generic problem of institution building 
in a developing economy under severe scarcity of key inputs (human capital, fi-
nancial resources, etc.). Inconsistent regulations, lack of enforcement, and weak 
monitoring are other generic problems faced by many countries (Jha, Markandya, 
and Vossenar 1999), and not only in the area of environmental protection.  
Public participation is an essential ingredient to successful environmental 
protection, because institution building relies on a political process and coali-
tion formation. First, this process can be positive by fostering partnerships 
between the public, firms, and authorities. The government can be a facilita-
tor for private industry by promoting the dissemination of information on new 
technology and environmental regulations. The process can also be coercive 
in the sense of fostering disclosure and violation of environmental regulations 
(illegal discharges). This principle has been effective in developing econo-
mies, such as China (Dasgupta and Wheeler 1997), although complaints tend 
to be positively associated with higher income and human capital. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter explores second-best policy issues affecting trade and environment 
linkages. I explain sufficient conditions for welfare-improving piecemeal trade 
and environmental policy reforms in a small, polluted economy. Several robust 
messages arise. First, the use of trade barriers for environmental protection is 
inadequate. In general, both consumption and production activities do pollute, 
and tariffs are usually ineffectual instruments to tackle pollution and environ-
mental degradation. An implicit ranking of instruments emerges from our dis-
cussion of policy reforms to address pollution emissions, which follows the tar-
geting principle (Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan 1998). The closer is the 
instrument to the pollution, the less distorting it is elsewhere in the economy. 
Hence, an emissions tax is the best instrument to address pollution emissions 
and minimise distortionary e ffects elsewhere in the economy; feasible input 
taxes are preferable to production taxes, which are themselves preferable to tar-28  BEGHIN 
 
 
iffs (see Lloyd 1992). Another message is that the case against harmonisation of 
environmental policies across nations is very strong.  
Finally, environmental protection appears feasible in developing econo-
mies. Coordination of environmental protection with trade integration is im-
portant because it legitimises environmental side agreements in trade agree-
ments to avoid the exacerbation of environmental distortions. These side 
agreements, such as in the case of NAFTA, can be based on reciprocal recog-
nition of each country’s environmental regulation and do not imply harmoni-
sation of environmental standards across countries. They also achieve a prag-




1 I refer technically oriented readers to Copeland 1994; Beghin, Roland-Holst, and van der Mens-
brugghe 1997; Metcalfe and Beghin 2000; and Beghin and Dessus 2001 for a formal development 
of these results. See also the appendices in Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1996 for an alternative formal 
treatment of many of the issues discussed in this section. 
2 The general equilibrium marginal damage of pollution is net of the feedback effect of pollution on 
tax revenue arising in consumption, via tariffs and taxes on pollution. 
3 See Copeland 1994 for more of these special cases. 
4 Convexity of the revenue function in prices and concavity of consumer expenditure in prices 
imply that the Hessian of second derivatives of net revenue (revenue – expenditure) is positive 
semi-definite; hence, the quadratic form made of the vector of distortions multiplied by the latter 
Hessian and post-multiplied by the vector of proportional changes in distortions is semi-positive. 
This result ensures that welfare is non-decreasing (or weakly increasing).  
5 See Copeland 1994 and Metcalfe and Beghin 2000 for further details on these results on mixed 
regimes.  
6 For China and Vietnam, we use consensus estimates of GDP growth as an alternative to the Data 
Resource, Incorporated forecast. 
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